A novel of the postwar, then, oriented toward the future (which of course would be the author's and her contemporary readers' present, give or take a few years), no matter how bleak or uncertain that future might be: that is one possible description of Les Mandarins, and it is a good one. In this essay I would like to explore a different possibility: namely, that Les Mandarins is as much about the war as about the postwar, and as much about the past as about the future. More exactly, I want to argue that it is a novel about memory of the war and the Occupation, and that its meaning for contemporary readers was deeply linked (even if not in a fully recognized way) to that most troubled period in recent French history. Oddly enough, it is from our own contemporary perspective, so heavily informed by concerns over memory and World War II, that this aspect of the novel comes to the fore. Beauvoir's characters struggle with from one end of the novel to the other, just as it was a question that she treated in some of her philosophical and autobiographical works.
Falsifying memory and the ethics of ambiguity
One of the best known episodes in the novel concerns Henri Perron, the writer, newspaper editor and former Resistance hero whose story and inner life we follow throughout the novel (the other center of consciousness is Anne Dubreuilh, a psychoanalyst whose first-person narrative alternates with the chapters concerning Henri). Having written a highly successful play--whose main character, not by chance, is a woman after the war, coming to terms with the murder of her husband by the Nazis-- What to do? Henri feels tormented, but not for very long: weighing in the balance Josette's distress and threatened suicide against his "scruples of conscience," 5 he decides to give false testimony. In the judge's chambers, facing the two deportees who revere him, he smoothly insists that Mercier was with him, far from Paris, on the day the women were arrested. Their clear memory of having been pointed out to the two Germans who arrested them by the accused Mercier is thus suddenly made murky. "Elles étaient aussi sûres de l'identité de Mercier que de la loyauté d'Henri et il y avait de la panique dans leurs yeux" ("They were as sure of Mercier's identity as of Henri's loyalty, and there was panic in their eyes"), the narrator writes. In the end, the two women withdraw their testimony and Mercier goes free. The narrator remarks: "Pour ne pas soupçonner Henri, elles consentaient à douter de leur souvenir le plus sûr; mais avec le passé, le présent vacillait autour d'elles, et la réalité même; Henri eut horreur de cette perplexité égarée au fond de leurs yeux" (II, 323; "In order not to suspect Henri, they agreed to doubt their surest memory; but along with the past, the present trembled around them, as did reality itself; Henri was horrified by that wild perplexity in their eyes").
Henri's decision to perjure himself-that is, to create a false memory of the past and thus to negate the past as it actually occurred-is not condemnable, according to the ethics developed in Beauvoir's philosophical essay of 1947, Pour une morale de l'ambiguité. In that work she rejects any ethics based on absolute principles, other than the principle of individual freedom and choice. In the absence of general rules, each moral choice must be considered in its specific circumstances, and only the person who makes the choice can determine its appropriateness. 6 In one passage, Beauvoir specifically discusses the significance of the past in relation to the present and to future projects, and concludes that there should be no "cult" of the past; if, in a given situation, the past must be "destroyed" in order to save the future, then so be it: "this destruction is a sacrifice" (sacrifice of what? Of the truth, perhaps), but she concludes that a genuine ethics does not bid one to refuse such a sacrifice; instead, "one must assume it" (p. 137).
We could say that Henri "assumes"-that is, takes responsibility for-his own destruction of the past, which he accomplishes for the sake of the present well-being of a woman he pities. To his credit, or in any case interestingly, after saving Josette, he breaks off his relationship with her. He also "confesses" what he did to the older philosopher Dubreuilh, who functions as a kind of moral compass in the novel.
Dubreuilh does not condemn him: "In a curved space, one cannot draw a straight line,"
says Dubreuilh. "You cannot lead a correct life in a society that is not correct" (II, 343).
So from Henri's point of view (and, evidently, from Beauvoir's and the novel's point of view as well), his falsified memory makes sense: while he is not proud of it, he is willing to own it, and the reader is invited to go along with that. What the novel hints is more difficult to accept, however, is the effect of his false testimony on the two women who feel "reality itself" vacillating as they begin to doubt their surest memory on the almost nobody mentions Lambert's fiancée, even though her fate is referred to several times in the book. What is truly astonishing, however, from today's perspective, are the omissions concerning Nadine's young lover Diégo, whose death plays an important role in Nadine's behavior and psychology-and she is one of the main characters in the novel.
Many reviewers mention Diégo, but they all omit the fact that he was Jewish, and that he died as a Jew. Dominique Aury, writing in La Nouvelle Revue Française, speaks of Nadine's "fiancé," but merely says that "the Germans killed him"
9
; the reviewer in Esprit refers to "the horrifying death of her first lover," but does not elaborate 10 
; in Les
Nouvelles Littéraires, we read that "Nadine lost her first lover, a new Rimbaud, killed at 17"-no indication of who killed him, or why 11 ; Le Monde doesn't mention Diégo at all.
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As for the Communist press, L'Humanité tells us that "the war killed her young lover,"
while Les Lettres Françaises explains that he was "shot by the Germans." 13 To demonstrate these ambivalent memories requires close reading; a good place to start is the passage where Diégo is first mentioned, in the second half of chapter one.
This placement is quite important, for it is the first time we hear Anne Dubreuilh's voice as narrator-after this, the novel will proceed in alternating chapters devoted to Henri (told by a third-person narrator) and to Anne (narrated by her). 14 who had been Sartre's student in 1941 at the Lycée Pasteur. Bourla and "Lise" (Beauvoir's former student and sometime lover Natalie Sorokine, who is considered to be the model for Nadine in Les Mandarins) became lovers, sharing a room in the same hotel as Beauvoir. She tells exactly the same story here as in the novel, down to details such as the fact that she would go to "tuck them in" at night and Bourla would ask her to kiss him as well as Lise. 18 One difference is that in the memoir, the story of Bourla's arrest is not told right after he is first mentioned but occurs fifty pages later, in its chronological place:
in the spring of 1943, around the time of the Allied landing in Italy. It is exactly the same story: Bourla arrested with his father, the father's blond girlfriend, the German named Félix who was going to get them out. Beauvoir and Nadine ride out to Drancy on their bikes, are told by people in a café that "armored trains" had left the station during the night, and see the empty camp with their own eyes; the narrative then continues as in the novel, right up to Félix's horrible pronouncement that Bourla and his father were shot a long time ago.
Here then is a case where an autobiography "borrows" textually from a novel, instead of the more usual sequence where a novelist might incorporate into fiction an incident he or she had already noted in an autobiography. But the really significant fact, or rather the problem, is that this time it is Beauvoir herself who misremembers the episode of the empty camp: the fictional Anne's failure of memory has here migrated to her creator, and we can no longer be sure what is remembered and what is invented.
What we can be sure of is that the incident, as it is recounted both in the novel and in the memoir, is historically inaccurate.
Is it more serious when Beauvoir herself, rather than her character, errs in her 20 In this instance, the lack of correction creates a situation of ambivalent memory:
we are told what Beauvoir knew, and deplored, about the sad fate of the Jews during the war; but we are not told the whole story. In particular, we are never told that the arrests--and even the deportations--were most often carried out by French police, or by French and Germans together, not just by the Germans; in both the novel and the memoir, it is the Germans who ring the doorbell early in the morning to arrest the boy and his father. "What should one do with a corpse?" Nadine screamed for several nights after she learned of Diégo's death; but eventually, she stopped screaming, and on this Christmas eve she had danced with Lambert, who had also lost a loved one, his Jewish fiancée Rosa. Waving the flag or constructing monuments is a betrayal of the dead, Anne thinks, but "leaving their ashes in peace" is not much better: in either case, they're no longer with us, whereas once "they had been our brothers." She continues: "Mais nous n'avons pas le choix: pourquoi nous ont-ils quittés? Qu'ils nous laissent en paix eux aussi.
Oublions-les." (I, 44; "But we have no choice: why did they leave us? Let them leave us in peace too. Let us forget them").
The only way to go on living, it seems, without dying of remorse at having survived, is to turn the blame onto the dead themselves: Why did they leave us? What this question elides is the fact that people like Diégo and Rosa, and so many thousands of others, did not "leave" their loved ones-they were forcibly torn from them. The defense mechanism of projection, whereby one projects onto others the fault one blames in oneself, is here beautifully illustrated. In such projection, the difference between subject and object, between active agent and passive victim, becomes blurred, or reversed. Why did they leave us? We are not responsible for their leaving; let us forget them. It is all the more interesting that Anne is the person saying this, for she is a psychoanalyst by profession and presumably recognizes projection for what it is: an attempt by the psyche to protect itself from a crippling sense of guilt or shame. In fact, she returns to the question of forgetting at several other moments in the novel, notably when she is treating patients who have undergone trauma during the war. While she realizes that to help them go on with their lives she has to help them forget, she feels quite ambivalent on that score. And much later, at the very end of the novel (1948 in fictional time), she confronts the question once again, again in relation to the death of Jews in France. Trying to dissuade Nadine, who wants to make the addict Sézenac "pay" for all the Jews he betrayed, Anne tells her: "What good would it do to make him pay?
We cannot ressuscite the dead." Nadine retorts, "But we cannot forget them," to which being alive" (FC, 45). Between these two passages of shame and guilt, however, she details how interesting life was becoming for her and Sartre, after the war: the trips they took, the new people they met, the books they published, the plays they saw. In her later comments on Les Mandarins, she assigns joie de vivre to the male writer, and shame and guilt to the female psychoanalyst. But she also tells us that she herself identified with both of those characters. Perhaps what I have been calling her ambivalent memories of the Occupation are another version of that split.
Finally, it is not surprising that the ambivalence of those memories manifests itself most strongly in relation to the Jews. Hélène Berr, a young assimilated Jewish woman who kept her journal in Paris from 1942 until close to the day she and her parents were arrested by French police, early in the morning of March 3, 1944 , remarks more than once how difficult she finds it to look at people on the street and in the métro as she walks among them with her yellow star, and to realize that they don't really comprehend, and don't want to comprehend, what is happening to the Jews. One non-Jewish acquaintance asks her, in October 1943, when she has already seen many of her friends deported, whether she "misses being able to go out at night" (because of the laws forbidding Jews to frequent theaters and restaurants). "My God," she writes, "he thinks we are still at that stage!" 21 And a month later, when a neighbor expresses shock and outrage upon hearing that a young Jewish woman and her two babies have been taken to Drancy, Hélène notes somewhat bitterly that "finally she understood, because it happened to someone she knew." She then continues: "Not to know, not to understand, even when one knows, because a door remains closed in you, the door which, when it finally opens, allows you to realize the part you simply knew. That is the immense drama of these times. No one knows anything about the people who are suffering." (Journal, 219-220).
We could similarly say that for many years after the war, no one wanted to remember exactly how things went with the Jews at Drancy, and elsewhere in France.
But we should recall as well that "only" about 25% of the Jews of France were murdered during the war, while the rate was much higher in other European countries from which Jews were deported. Many non-Jewish Frenchmen and women went out of their way to help Jews, at danger to themselves and their families.
Beauvoir was not among those "righteous Gentiles," but she did remember Drancy, in her writings, at a time when few others did; and she also expressed remorse and shame at the suffering of others during the war, especially Jews. The fact that she did so with some ambivalence, alternating between horror and joie de vivre, shows that she was human.
NOTES
